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PARKLANDS AND FEDERALLY FUNDED 
HIGHWAY PROJECTS: THE IMPACT OF 
CONSERVATION SOCIETY V. TEXASl 
By 'John W. Giorgio-:-
Conservation Society v. Texas, decided by the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, evidences the 
entrance of courts into "a new battleground [where they will be] 
guided by the solemn expression of Congressional will to preserve 
parklands and the environment from harm or destruction at the 
hands of federal-aid projects."2 The court in this case analyzed 
the Department of Transportation's environmental policies and 
related procedures. The Department's duties in this regard have 
been mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969,3 the Department of Transportation Act of 1968,4 and the 
Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 1968.5 
In 1955, in a proposal to the Texas Highway Department, 
officials of the City of San Antonio called for the construction of 
a city multi-lane highway, to be known as the North Express-
way.6 Five years later, the state, having accepted the city's pro-
posal, chose a route for the highway that was to require the 
taking of portions of the Brackenridge-Olmos Parklands, located 
in a densely populated area of the city. In 1961 the proposed 
acquisition of the selected right-of-way was approved in a state-
wide bond issue election.7 In order to qualify for federal aid, 
which would cover one-half of the highway's cost, the state then 
conducted a public hearing in accordance with federal law. 8 
Thereupon, the Federal Bureau of Public Roads indicated that 
the project had met preliminary requirements for federal funding, 
such indication being the first federal action with respect to the 
project. 9 
Between 1961 and 1967, the only activity that the state took 
with regard to the highway was the negotiation with affected 
land-owners for the right-of-way.lo In December 1967, however, 
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the San Antonio Conservation Society, fearing ultimate destruc-
tion of the park, entered federal district court and sought to 
have the state of Texas enjoined from starting any construction 
on the highwayY The suit was not, however, pressed to a quick 
conclusion. In December 1969, while the suit was still pending, 
the federal Secretary of Transportation issued a press release in 
which he stated that he could not approve any construction 
through parklands.I2 He indicated, however, that construction to 
the north and south of the parklands would be approved, but 
only after an agreement was reached to study routes alternative 
to the middle (parkland) segment. In August 1970 the Texas High-
way Department so agreed, whereupon federal funds were 
authorized to begin construction of the two end segments of the 
highwayY 
The Conservation Society then proceeded with its earlier suit 
for a preliminary injunction. It specifically requested that the 
Texas Highway Department be prohibited from letting contracts 
on construction of the two end segments.14 The district court 
denied the Conservation Society's motion for a preliminary in-
junction and granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
mentY The Conservation Society proceeded to the circuit court 
and requested a stay pending an appeal to that court; the motion, 
however, was denied. I6 Certain members of the Conservation 
Society17 then successfully petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court for a stay; at the same time, they also petitioned for a writ 
of certiorari on the district court's denial of the preliminary in-
junction.Is The Supreme Court, however, in December 1970, 
vacated the stayI9 and, with two justices dissenting, denied 
certiorari.20 
The case then finally returned to the circuit court of appeals, 
where it was held that the Secretary of Transportation should 
not have divided the project into three segments to be considered 
separately, nor should he have approved release of funds for the 
end segments without having first conducted a detailed environ-
mental study of the project as a whole.21 In reaching its decision, 
the court made reference to three federal statutes: the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,22 the Department of Trans-
portation Act of 1968,23 and the Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 
1968.24 The court also relied heavily on the reasoning of Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,25 which was decided by the 
Supreme Court shord y after certiorari had been denied to the 
petitioners in Conservation Society.26 
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It is submitted that the circuit court in Conservation Society 
made no error in holding that the above three statutes impose 
strict requirements on the Secretary with respect to highway 
construction through parklands. These statutes and the court's 
interpretation thereof as well as its interpretation of the pertinent 
case law are examined below. Reference is also made to relevant 
cases that have been decided subsequent to Conservation Society. 
THE STATUTES 
The first of the three statutes to be noted is the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 196927 (hereinafter, NEPA). This 
act announces, in extremely broad terms, a national commitment 
to preserve the environment. Section 101(A) of NEPA, stressing 
the importance of conserving environmental quality, declares 
that it is the policy of the federal government to ensure that 
environmental factors be given detailed consideration in the 
planning of federal action.28 In spite of this broad commitment, 
however, section 101(A) has not yet been read as creating sub-
stantive rights in citizens to challenge federal action or inaction 
in the area of environmental protection.29 
After setting forth the general federal policy in the area of 
environmental protection, NEPA establishes specific procedures 
to be followed by administrative agencies when considering major 
federal projects. Section 102(C) provides that before commence-
ment of any federal project that may significantly affect the en-
vironment, the responsible federal official is to submit to the 
Council on Environmental QualittO a detailed statement setting 
forth the environmental impact of the proposed project as well 
as measures that will be undertaken to minimize any potentially 
adverse environmental effects. The report must also s'pecify any 
alternatives to the proposed project whereby envIronmental 
damage would be avoided.3! Since NEPA becomes relevant when-
ever a federal project may significantly affect environmental 
quality, most projects considered by the Department of Trans-
portation will require compliance with NEPA procedures. 
The second and third statutes that the court treated were the 
Department of Transportation Act of 196832 (hereinafter, DOT 
Act) and the Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 196833 (hereinafter, 
Highway Act). These two statutes will be discussed together since 
the critical provision in each, the declaration of a federal policy, 
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is virtually identical. Section 4(f) of the DOT Act and section 138 
of the Highway Act (hereinafter, sections 4(f) and 138) announce: 
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort 
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside 
and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, 
and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate 
and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban 
Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing 
transportation plans and programs that include measures to main-
tain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the 
effective date of [the Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 1968] [the De-
partment of Transportation Act of 1968], the Secretary shall not ap-
prove any program or project which requires the use of any publicly 
owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife or water-
fowl refuge of national, State or local significance as determined by 
the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or 
any land from an historic site of national, State or local significance 
as so determined by such official unless (1) there is no feasible and 
prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program 
includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, 
recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site re-
sulting from such use. 
Unlike NEPA there is no requirement that formal findings be 
submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality. However 
the above quoted sections reveal that there is a similarity in ob-
jectives between these two statutes and the NEPA. For example, 
section 102 (C) (iii) of NEPA states that in any environmental 
impact report the federal official must include the alternatives to 
the proposed project. Sections 4(f) and 138 also call for specifica-
tions as to project alternatives. Additionally, however, the latter 
two sections require that the Secretary not approve any parkland 
project unless he can show that the project's alternatives are not 
feasible and prudent.34 
One of the major problems in interpreting sections 4(f) and 138 
involves the meaning of the term "feasible and prudent alterna-
tive." This problem will be discussed in further detail below. It 
is appropriate here, however, to recognize that nowhere in the 
statute, the legislative history,35 or the DOT regulations36 is it 
clearly indicated what factors should be taken into account when 
considering possible alternatives. Uncertainty may develop, for 
example, when there are but two possible routes for a highway, 
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one of which would require the taking of valuable parklands, the 
other of which would require the relocation of substantial num-
bers of families and businesses. In such a situation, a question 
arises as to whether environmental considerations should be 
controlling. In this regard, one should note carefully the language 
of sections 4(f) and 138: the Secretary shall not approve a trans-
portation project through a parkland unless there is no feasible 
and prudent alternative.37 The word "unless" has the effect of 
transmuting what at first appears to be a mandate (the Secretary 
"shall not" approve) into an authorization for the exercise of 
discretion. As considered below, however, Conservation Society 
held that the application of this discretion is subject to restrictive 
standards. 
The second part of sections 4(f) and 138 provides that when 
there is no feasible and prudent alternative to a project that may 
result in some environmental damage, the Secretary must see 
that every effort is made to ensure that there will be only a mini-
mum amount of harm done.38 This provision goes even further 
than section 102(C) (ii) of NEPA, merely requires that a refer-
ence be made to possible adverse effects on the environment. The 
DOT and Highway Acts thus present environmentalists with an 
important weapon by which they can effectively control the 
extent of damage attendant to federal highway activity. 
It must be recognized, however, that not all parks are automati-
cally protected under sections 4(f) and 138. These sections limit 
protection only to those parks which are of "national, state or 
local significance. "39 Unless a park is of some significance as a 
park or recreation site there may be no bar to the taking of such 
parklands. This part of the two sections provides also that such a 
determination of "significance" should be made by the federal, 
state or local official who has jurisdiction over the parkland. The 
question arises at which level-local, state, or federal-can final 
determination be made to the park's local "significance." Possible 
answers to this question are examined below. 
THE ISSUES 
The Scope of the Secretary's Discretion 
Any analysis of the Secretary's discretionary power regarding 
parkland highway construction must begin with the statutes. In 
Conservation Society the court dealt with the NEPA in a summary 
fashion and found that since the Secretary of Transportation did 
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not file an environmental impact report as required by that act, 
he was in violation of federallaw.40 
I j As to the DOT and Highway Acts, the court found that the 
Secretary's division of the project into three segments and his 
approval of funds for the construction of the north and south 
segments were an abuse of discretion under sections 4(f) and 138 
of those two acts,4l The court, focussing on semantics, reasoned 
that since those sections provide that "the Secretary shall not 
approve any ... project which requires the use of any publicly 
owned land from a park . .. "42, the Secretary was not authorized 
to split the single highway project into three separate segments, 
each to be separately administered. The court w'as then able, 
under the Administrative Procedure Act,l'3 to set aside the Secre-
tary's actions as being beyond his statutory power. 
In reaching this decision, the court contemplated what effect 
splitting the project into three segments would have on the 
Secretary's duty to consider possible alternatives." It concluded 
that there would have been virtually no alternative to construc-
tion through the park if construction had been completed on 
either side of it. This fact had been recognized earlier by Mr. 
Justice Douglas in his dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of 
certiorari. He posed the following questions: 
How can end segments of a highway aimed at the heart of a park be 
allowed without appraising the dangers of drawing a dotted line be.-
tween the two segments? ... What are the alternatives that would 
save the park completely? ... Could the freeway be rerouted so as 
to avoid the parklands completely and leave it as a sanctuary?46 
The problem of piecemeal division as it relates to the Secre-
tat;y's discretion also surfaced in Citizens Committee for the 
Hudson Valley v. Volpe.46 In that case the Army Corps of Engi-
neers was planning to construct a freeway along the Hudson 
River. In order to complete the freeway, the Corps of Engineers 
would have had to construct a dike and a causeway. Since juris-
diction over the construction and maintenance of dikes was 
vested in Congress under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,47 
and the jurisdiction over the construction of causeways was 
vested in the Department of Transportation by the Department 
of Transportation Act,48 the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York ruled that the Corps of Engineers would 
have had to obtain the approval of both the Congress and the 
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Secretary of Transportation before the construction of either the 
dike or the causeway could begin.49 If the dike had already been 
constructed, then the Secretary of Transportation would have 
been limited in the number of possible alternatives to the cause-
way he could consider under the DOT and Highway Acts. Specifi-
cally citing section 4(f) of the DOT Act, the court stated: 
Such a piecemeal approach to the exercise of federal agency jurisdic-
tion would also frustrate one of the main purposes of the Department 
of Transportation Act, i.e. the conservation of the country's natural 
resources. Before the Secretary of Transportation is to approve any 
project within his jurisdiction, he has to determine, inter alia, the 
effects of the project on the natural resources of the area.60 
The court in Conservation Society dealt with another question 
regarding the scope of the Secretary's discretion. As indicated 
above, section 4(f) of the DOT Act and section 138 of the High-
way Act prohibited the Secretary from approving a highway 
project unless it has no "feasible and prudent alternative."61 
Although this provision is, on its face, vague, it has been given 
greater precision by the courts. The court in Conservation Society 
noted the interpretation given to this provision by the Su-
preme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.52 In 
Overton the Secretary of Transportation had already approved a 
route through Memphis's Overton Park; moreover all of the 
families and businesses along that route had been relocated and 
most of the buildings destroyed. This situation is to be contrasted 
with Conservation Society, wherein the Secretary had given ap-
proval only to construction of the two end segments, which 
approval posed no immediate threat to the city park.63 In Overton, 
the Secretary argued that the "feasible and prudent alternative" 
provision required the Secretary to "engage in a wide-ranging 
balancing of competing interests."64 This was evident, he main-
tained, in the legislative histories of the DOT Act and the High-
way Act.66 For example, the House-Senate Conference Report on 
the DOT Act stated: 
The Amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended to make 
it unmistakably clear that neither section constitutes a mandatory 
prohibition against the use of enumerated parklands, but rather, is 
a discretionary authority which must be used with both wisdom and 
reason. The Congress does not believe, for example, that sub-
stantial numbers of people should be required to move in order to 
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preserve these lands, or clearly enumerated local preferences should 
be overruled on the basis of his authority.56 
The Supreme Court, however, noting that the legislative 
history of section 4(f) was ambiguous,67 was not convinced. It 
looked instead to the express language of the statute in order to 
determine its meaning. The court then established separate cri-
teria for determining whether an alternative was "feasible" and 
whether it was "prudent." The court found that in order for the 
Secretary to find that an alternative route was not "feasible," 
he would have to conclude that "as a matter of sound engineering 
it would not be feasible to build the highway along any other 
route."58 This would leave very little room for agency discretion. 
In order for the Secretary to find that an alternative route was 
not "prudent," he would have to find that the presence of truly 
unusual factors required the use of the parklands for highway 
construction: 
It is obvious that in most cases consideration of cost, directness of 
route, and community disruption will indicate that parklands 
should be used for highway construction whenever possible. Al-
though it may be necessary to transfer funds from one jurisdiction 
to another, there will always be a smaller outlay required from the 
public purse (114 Congo Rec. 24037, statement by Senator Yar-
borough) when parklands are used since the public already owns the 
land and there will be no need to pay for the right-of-way. And since 
people do not live or work in parks, if a highway is built on parklands 
no one will have to leave his home or give up his business. Such 
factors are common substantially to all highway construction. Thus 
if Congress intended those factors to be on an equal footing with the 
preservation of parklands there would have been no need for the 
statutes.59 
The Supreme Court concluded that unless there existed such 
restrictive engineering decisions and such truly unusual factors, 
the "feasible and prudent alternative" provision prohibited the 
taking of parklands.60 
A recent circuit court case in the District of Columbia, decided 
after Conservation Society, also examines the meaning of the 
"feasible and prudent" provision. In D.C. Federation of Civic 
Associations, et al. V. Volpe61 the court rejected a finding by the 
Secretary that there was no feasible and prudent alternative to 
the construction of the Three Sisters Bridge across the Potomac 
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River. It then required him to reevaluate the existing alterna-
tives. The court further asserted that even if no feasible and 
prudent alternative routes existed,62 this would not necessarily 
mean that construction could be permitted along the proposed 
route. The court indicated that it was conceivable that the most 
feasible and prudent alternative to a proposed route would be no 
route whatsoever. And the court concluded that if it were shown 
that the route could not be built in accordance with federal law, 
then it simply could not be built.63 
As the above cases suggest, the Secretary's discretionary power 
regarding decisions on "feasible and prudent alternatives" is 
limited in scope. An overextension of this limited discretion is 
not excused by the fact that it is made in good faith; the court in 
Conservation Society expressly stated that it is not necessary to 
find bad faith dealings by the Secretary in order to find him viola-
tive of his discretionary power.46 His decision-making process is 
limited in the sense that it be essentially one dimensional: he is 
not required to balance economic and environmental interests;65 
rather, he is simply required to strive to protect parkland envi-
ronments from the damages attendant to massive transportation 
projects. And certainly, the Secretary's exercise of discretion 
cannot be colored by political considerations. 
Political pressure, however, was an issue in D.C. Federation 
et al. v. Volpe, mentioned above. The circuit court in that case 
invalidated the Secretary's approval of the Three Sisters Bridge 
in Washington because at the time he conducted the environ-
mental study he was subject to undue political pressure.66 Con-
gressman William Natcher, Chairman of the House District of 
Columbia Committee, had declared his intention to block any 
funds for the construction of the Washington subway system 
unless the Three Sisters Bridge project was approved by the 
Secretary. At the district court level, it was noted: 
... on the basis of the Secretary's contemporaneous statements and 
his testimony before the court, there is no question that the pressure 
regarding the rapid transit system appropriations was given some 
consideration at the time of the approval of the project.67 
Nevertheless the district court ruled that even though the Secre-
tary was susceptible to this political pressure, that fact was not 
in itself sufficient to invalidate his decision. The circuit court, 
however, reversed and remanded. The Secretary was required to 
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make a new determination on the feasibility and prudence of 
alternatives with regard only for those factors made relevant by 
Congress in the applicable statutes.68 The circuit court found: 
The impact of this pressure is sufficient, standing alone, to invalidate 
the Secretary's action. Even if steps were taken to comply with the 
statutes, extraneous pressures intruded into the calculus of con-
sideration on which the Secretary's decision was based.69 
While political pressure was not involved in Conservation 
Society, there was pressure of another sort that evidently influ-
enced the Secretary's decision to fund construction of the two 
end segments. As noted above the circuit court in Conservation 
Society found that the Secretary had attempted to balance the 
demands of the Texas Highway Department to begin construc-
tion against the desire of the Conservation Society to preserve 
the park. The Secretary, in good faith, had tried to satisfy both 
groups. Yet it would seem that such an attempt was as much in 
contradiction of the statutes, and the Congressional intent there 
underlying, as was the submission to political pressure in D.C. 
Federation. Although the Secretary is required to "cooperate and 
consult with" the states, he is to do so only to the end of main-
taining or enhancing the beauty of the lands traversed. Despite the 
possibility that this provision might be interpreted loosely with 
respect to roads through open areas, it seems appropriate, in light 
of declared policy, to interpret the provision strictly with respect 
to roads through urban parklands. It would seem impossible to 
"maintain or enhance" the beauty of urban lands that are to be 
touched by a new roadway if that roadway were permitted to 
traverse the very parks that give urban lands whatever beauty 
they possess. 
Although the presence or absence of undue external pressure 
was not determinative in Conservation Society, it might yet be-
come a critical issue when the Secretary announces his findings 
as to alternative routes for the middle (parkland) segment. In 
such an event, the reviewing court might consider extending the 
reasoning of D.C. Federation to influences of a less political 
character. 
Parks oj "Local Significance" 
Section 4(f) of the DOT Act and section 138 of the Highway 
Act protect from federal highway projects any park that is found 
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to be of National, State or "local significance as determined by 
the Federal, State or local official having jurisdiction thereof."70 
A problem may arise in the event a local official expressly deter-
mines that a particular park in his jurisdiction is, as a park, of no 
local significance. Given such a negative determination, it may 
be asked whether the Secretary may still make his own finding 
as to a park's local significance. It may be argued that the word 
"or" permits the Secretary to make an independent determina-
tion if the local (or State) officials have made a negative determi-
nation (or if they have made no determination at all). More 
generally, it may be argued that a negative finding at anyone level 
need not bind officials at any other level. However, if a positive 
finding is made at anyone level then that determination is bind-
ing upon officials at any other level. 
In Conservation Society the court's treatment of this local 
significance issue, although ultimately properly resolved, was 
more circuitous than the treatment suggested above. Shortly 
after the enactment of section 4(f), the San Antonio City Council 
passed a resolution that the Brackenridge-Olmos Parklands were 
of primary local significance as part of the right-of-way for the 
North Expressway and only of secondary local significance as 
parklands. 71 The city council evidently hoped that the Secretary 
of Transportation would honor this determination. The circuit 
court, however, refusing to find this resolution determinative on 
the question of local significance, simply asserted that the Secre-
tary should have had final review over a determination of local 
significance by a local official. 72 The express language of section 
4(f), said the court, indicates that an appropriate local official 
has the right to pass on the local significance of a park in his juris-
diction; but the ultimate purpose of section 4(f) would be 
thwarted if an appropriate federal official were not afforded the 
opportunity for a full administrative review over any determi-
nation by a local official. The circuit court concluded: 
The question, therefore, is whether Congress intended to leave the 
choice between parks of local significance and federal-aid highways to 
local authorities; or whether Congress, in passing section 4(f), has 
already made the choice between the two uses. Only one construction 
fairly can be given to section 4(f), and that is that Congress itself 
had made the choice between the two uses. Clearly, Congress did not 
intend to leave the decision whether federal funds would be used to 
build highways through parks of local significance up to the city 
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councils across the nation. If there was any doubt about this ques-
tion before Overton Park, there most assuredly is no longer any 
doubt.73 
The court in Conservation Society made reference to the Su-
preme Court's discussion of "local significance" in the Overton 
case. The district court in Overton had found that when the 
Memphis City Council approved the use of Overton Park for the 
highway it thereby determined that the park was of no local sig-
nificance. 74 The district court and the circuit court of appeals 
accepted that determination at face value. The two courts con-
cluded that because of this determination, the protective pro-
visions of sections 4(f) and 138 could not apply. The Supreme 
Court, however, even though it did not expressly reject the 
authority or validity of this local determination, held that the 
sections did apply.76 One may thus infer that the local officials' 
negative determination regarding "local significance" was not a 
binding determination on that issue. 76 
In Harrisburg Coalition v. Volpe,77 a case decided three months 
before Conservation Society, the federal circuit court in Pennsyl-
vania found that the Secretary of Transportation was empowered 
to review any local determination of local significance and to 
reverse any such determination that he found to be erroneous. 
The court stated that had it come to a contrary conclusion then 
"the operation of the Executive branch of the federal government 
would be dependent on the action or inaction of a state or one of 
its municipalities and the Secretary of Transportation would be 
powerless to do anything about it"78 
Federal Involvement: Its Threshold and Effects 
In dicta, the court addressed the question of the nature of 
federal involvement. 79 The court stated that the North Express-
way had become a federal project-and thus subject to federal 
"protective devices"-on the day the Secretary authorized the 
release of funds to begin construction of the two end segments. 80 
It was significant to the court that this authorization had trig-
gered the letting of contracts and the active commencement of 
construction. 81 The fact that no federal monies had actually been 
applied to the project was of no consequence to the court. 
A case that is particularly relevant to this question was decided 
after Conservation Society by a federal district court in California. 
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In La Raza Unida v. Volpe,82 which involved the construction of 
the Foothills Freeway, California highway officials had failed to 
comply with the NEPA, DOT and Highway Acts. The court 
held that the highway project had become subject to federal law 
at the time the DOT approved the location design for the highway. 
Federal involvement was deemed to commence even prior to any 
DOT authorization for federal funding-the event that was con-
sidered critical in Conservation Society.83 The La Raza court 
stated: 
[C]ommon sense dictates that the federal protective devices apply 
before federal funds are sought. It does little good to shut the barn 
doors after all of the horses have run away. If the federal statutes 
and regulations are to supply any protection at all it must be prior 
to the time the residents have left and the deleterious effects to the 
environment have taken place. All the protections that Congress 
sought to establish would be futile gestures were a state able to 
ignore the spirit (and letter) of the various acts and regulations 
until it actually received federal funds. 84 
The reasoning of La Raza is sound. Federal participation in 
such matters as location design may give rise to expectations of 
ultimate federal funding. These expectations in turn might cause 
activity, such as the purchase of land along a proposed right-of-
way, that otherwise might not occur. It seems fitting then that 
any such activity be subject to federal controls. If these controls 
did not arise concurrently with federal involvement, the mere 
suggestion of federal assistance might be exploited by pro-
highway state officials so as to induce state commitment to a 
highway project. Then, once such a commitment were made, 
these officials could forcefully argue for the fulfillment of that 
project lest already expended funds be wasted. 
In Conservation Society the court volunteered that any attempt 
by the state to withdraw its application for federal aid would not 
thereby enable it to avoid federal controls. The above quotation 
and commentary regarding the threshold of federal involvement 
apply equally to the effect of such involvement. The only effec-
tive way to prevent abuse of federal assistance programs is 
to require that federal controls be indefeasible. Even if the 
withdrawing party were the federal government, rather than the 
state government, the federal controls should continue. Were it 
otherwise, state officials, on becomins convinced that their state 
was irrevocably committed to a proJect, might manipulate cir-
cumstances so as to compel the federal government to withdraw. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conservation Society v. Texas gives full force to the environ-
mental policies declared in the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, the Department of Transportation Act of 1968, and 
the Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 1968. The court rejected the 
contention that the Secretary of Transportation might use the 
"feasible and prudent alternative" provision of the latter two 
acts in such a way as to constrict the scope of his environmental-
protection duties. In construing the provision strictly, the court 
required that the Secretary, in his evaluation of proposed high-
ways through parklands, give utmost consideration to environ-
mental preservation. Moreover, the court made clear that the 
Secretary would not be bound by any local determination that a 
park was without local significance. Given such a determination, 
he would still be required to make an independent judgment on 
the local significance of the park in question. Finally, the court, 
in dicta, dealt with the meaning and effect of federal involvement 
in state highway programs. It stated that federal involvement 
might commence even prior to the utilization of federal monies 
and that, once federal involvement had commenced, a state could 
not thereafter avoid federal law by attempting to withdraw its 
request for federal aid. The nature of federal involvement awaits 
further analysis by the courts, and it is hoped that such analysis 
proceeds in the direction suggested by Conservation Society . 
.. +.---->-.-<~.+ .. 
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and ruled in favor of their appeal. The court did not indicate why 
certiorari was granted in Overton and not in Conservation Society. The 
facts in each case were not identical. In Overton the Secretary of Trans-
portation had already approved the route through the park, while in 
Conservation Society approval had only been given to construction of 
the two end segments. 
2742 U.S.C.A. §4332 (Supp. 1971). 
28 The full text of section 101(A) is: 
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activities 
on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly of the profound influences of population growth, high-
density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and 
new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the 
critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality 
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Pennsylvania Environmenetal Council v. Bartlett, 315 F.Supp. 238 
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found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
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61 49 V.S.C.A. §1653(f). 
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also S. Rep. No. 1340, 90th Congo 2d Sess. Section 19 (1968). 
66 Con. Rep. No. 1799, 90th Congo 2d Sess. Section 19 (1968). 
67 The court cited certain sections of the Congressional Record 
which indicate that the Secretary was meant to have limited discretion. 
114 Con. Rec. 24033-24037. 
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